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Collective Interventions After the
Cold War:
Reflections on the
U.N. Mission to the Congo,
1960-64
John F. Clark, Florida International University
In Lheaftermath of the Cold War, the world's states may now be
prepared the make greater use of collective military forces organized
through the United Nations to resolve conflicts having both internal and
international dimensions. Such a step would be in keeping with the
liberal internationalism generally (if inconsistently) supported by the
Western democracies in this century. Since the end of the Cold War,
the UN member states have organized military operations through the
UN to provide relief to civilian victims of civil strife in BosniaHerzegovina and Somalia, as well as rebutting Iraq's aggression in
Kuwait. Perhaps as meaningfully, the UN Security Council has
imposed sanctions on the military regime in Haiti for its
unconstitutional seizure of power despite (a) the apparent absence of an
international threat to peace and security and (b) the clear control of the
Haitian state apparatus by the Raoul Cedras government. This latter
case may signal a shift in the balance of principles in the UN in favor
of democracy and human rights, and away from the prerogatives of
sovereignty .
If such collective interventions are to become common in
international relations, careful consideration should go into the planning
and execution of future UN missions. Otherwise, they may fail to
achieve the ends for which they are designed , and thereby disillusion
states about the effectiveness of UN action. Accordingly, the end of the
Cold War is an important time to revisit past UN operations, and,
hopefully, glean lessons for the present. Among the UN peacekeeping
missions undertaken since the first in 1956, the UN mission to the
Congo 1 between 1960-64 has perhaps the most relevance for the
contemporary world. The UN mission to the Congo, officially known
by its French name , the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo
(ONUC), played an important role in the internal Congolese situation
as well as its international role. Moreover, the ultimate decisiveness of
1The Congo changed its name to "Zaire " in 1971, but I shall employ its
older name throughout this paper, which considers only the pre - 1971
period .
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the ONUC role in Congo contrasts with the indeterminate role of the
UN missions to Cyprus and Lebanon. Yet the mixed outcomes that the
ONUC mission produced in the Congo, as well as the differing values
of its observers, render it highly controversial to the present day. Here,
we shall explore the roots of the controversy over the ONUC mission,
and offer a post-Cold War assessment of the lessons it offers.

The Genesis
Mandate

of the Mission

and the Ambiguity

of Its

The events leading to the ONUC mission burst onto the world
stage with little warning. After nearly one hundred years of colonial
rule, Congo received its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960.
Elections organized the previous month had resulted in a plurality of
seats in the National Assembly for the Mouvement National Congolais
(MNC), led by the strongly nationalist Patrice Lumumba. After some
maneuvering by the Belgian governor to prevent it, Lumumba became
Prime Minister, and Joseph Kasavubu, a more cautious and moderate
leader of the Abako party, was elected President by the National
Assembly .2 At that time, the Congolese people were deeply divided by
ethnicity, language, and cultural practice. Moreover, the political
movements leading to independence had appeared and matured very
suddenly in the mid-1950s, and the Belgians had done precious little to
prepare the Congolese for their independence. 3 The lack of a
politically-prepared elite proved momentous for the fate of the Congo.
On 4 July 1960, Congolese troops of the Force Publique, Congo's
national army , began to mutiny against their (Belgian) officers, who
had remained in their posts after independence .4 The following day the
2 See

Hoskyns, pp .74 -77.
Abako stands for the "Alliance des
BaKongo," which was an ethnically -based party for the Kongo people of
lower Congo . It should be made clear that Prime Minister was the more
desirable post, one which Kasavubu had sought before Lumumba eventually
won it. Under the Congolese Loi Fondamentale, the President was
envisioned to play a mostly ceremonial role, such as the that played by the
President of Germany in that country 's contemporary political system.
3The two classic accounts of internal events leading to independence for
the Congo are Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian
Congo, (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1964) and Crawford Young,
Politics in the Congo : Decolonization and Independence, (Princeton:
Princeton Univ . Press, 1965). Notable in the lack of colonial preparation
was the virtual absence of any opportunity for the Congolese to attain a
university -level education until the very end of the 1950s.
4
Two chronologies of events in the Congo during this period are very
useful in tracing events. See Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping
in the Congo , 1960-1964, Vol. 4, A Congo Chronology, 1960 -1964,
(Washington : Brookings, 1966) and Howard M. Epstein, Revolt in the
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Belgian commander, General Emile Janssens, addressed the troops in
Leopoldville, and rejected out of hand their demands for reorganization
of the army. 5 Later that day, the mutiny spread to other Congolese
cities, and some Europeans were attacked by the Congolese soldiers.
With the mutinies and scattered attacks on Europeans continuing, the
Belgian government decided to use its troops to restore order in the
Congo. On 10 July Belgian troops from within the Congo and flowin
in from Belgium began to intervene against the mutinous troops. 6
This action infuriated Kasavubu and Lumumba, and had the immediate
effect of intensifying the mutinies and attacks on Europeans. 7 They
also led various Congolese authorities to begin a series of calls for
outside assistance, from the U.S. (July 12th), the UN (July 12th and
13th), Ghana (July 13th) and the Soviet Union (July 14th).
One should also recall another dimension of the Congo crisis with
which the UN soon became involved, the secession of Katanga. 8
Katanga (now Shaba) is the southern-most, mineral-rich, province of
the Congo that has served as the country's main source of wealth. In the
late 1950s, a political party called Conakat [Confederation des
Associations Tribales du Katanga] was organized in the province to
represent the interests of the "authentic Katangans," i.e., those groups
which had long inhabited the region.9 This party was also closely tied
to conservative Belgian commercial interests in Katanga. These foreign
interests, and their traditional African partners in Katanga, including
Conakat, favored strong local autonomy, if not outright independence
for Katanga. In the May 1960 elections in the Congo , Conakat won
Confo , 1960-64, (New York: Facts on File, 1965).
Among the demands of the soldiers were the Africanization of the
officer corps and increases in salary for African soldiers. In the course of
his speech, Janssens wrote the phrase "Before independence = after
independence" on a blackboard. See Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since
Independence : January 1960 to December 1961, (London: Oxford Univ .
Press, 1965), p.88 .
6 Under a Belgo -Congolese Treaty of Friendship which had been
negotiated but not yet ratified, the Belgians were allowed to keep their
troops stationed at two sites in the Congo, specifically, at Kitona (near
Leor,oldville, the capital) and Kamina (in northern Katanga province) .
See Hoskyns, pp.122-24 .
8The best single source on the secession specifically is Jules Gerard Libois, Katanga Secession, trans . Rebecca Young, (1963; trans. Univ . of
Wisconsin Press, 1966).
9Gerard-Libois, pp .11-12; the major groups that Conakat claimed to
represent were the Lunda, Baluba -Katanga, Bayeke, Basanga, Tshokwe,
Batabwa, and Babemba. Conakat represented those in these ethnic groups
who wished to distinguish themselves from the "outsiders" (the Baluba Kasai and Lulua), i.e ., those who had emigrated into Katanga from
neighboring Kasai over the previous decades .
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twenty-five (of sixty) seats in the provincial Assembly, and later won
the loyalty of thirteen independent representatives, giving it control
over the body. 10 On 16 June Moi"se Tshombe, the son-in-law of the
Lunda paramount chief, was voted President of the provincial
Assembly . Tshombe had already hinted in April that Katanga might
declare itself independent, and following disputes with Lumumba over
the formation of the central Congolese government, he declared Katanga
independent on 11 July. ll
In retrospect, one cannot help but be struck by the great rapidity
with which the ONUC mission was organized and dispatched. This
development reflects the great urgency that the major parties, including
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, felt in initiating the
mission . The Congolese (and Soviets) were anxious for the Belgian
troops to be withdrawn immediately because of the affront to Congolese
sovereignty it entailed; meanwhile the Western states supported an
immediate dispatch of UN troops both to protect Western lives and
property, and to eliminate any excuse for Soviet counter-intervention.
In response to Hammarskjold's call, the Security Council convened on
13 July, and passed a resolution the following day calling on Belgium
to withdraw its forces, and authorizing the Secretary-General to organize
a military force to be sent to the Congo in support of its government.
Due to the controversy it generated, one should be aware of the exact
wording of the key (second) activating clause of this resolution:
[The Security Council] f d]ecides to authorize the
Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in
consultation with the Government of the Republic of
the Congo, to provide the Government with such
military assistance as may be necessary until, through
the efforts of the Congolese Government with the
technical assistance of the United Nations, the
national security forces may be able, in the opinion
of the Government, to meet fully their tasks; 12

Only one day later, 15 July, the first UN -commanded troops, from
Tunisia and Ghana , arrived in the Congo. Then, on the following day,
Guinean, Moroccan, Ethiopian and more Tunisian troops were flown
into the Congo to serve under the UN banner. By 17 July there were

10 Hoskyns,

p.71.
pp.68 and 109. The Katangan Assembly later approved
this declaration on 17 July 1960.
12 U.N . Security Council Resolution S/4387 (14 July 1960) . The
Resolution was adopted by a vote of eight in favor to none against, with
three abstentions (China, France and the U.K.).
11Gerard -Libois,
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some 3,500 UN-commanded troops in the Congo. 13
The drawback of organizing and dispatching the ONUC with such
great haste, however, was a lack of concurrence over the real mandate of
the mission, which plagued it throughout its existence. Since there was
little time to resolve the issues surrounding the mission's purpose, the
Resolution authorizing the mission was worded vaguely, so as to
ensure both Western and Soviet support. 14 As Tunisian Security
Council representative Mongi Slim observed at the time,
The text [of the Resolution] is intentionally
imprecise about certain points in order to avoid
arguments in the Council which might prolong the
debate and delay the decision which is so vital in the
present situation and which has been expressly
requested by the Government of the Congo. 15
Secretary-General Hammarskjold was also aware, of course, that the
Resolution was vague, 16 but he intended to use his own diplomatic
skill to conduct the ONUC mission in such a way as to restore order in
the Congo without further unilateral intervention.
From the Congolese perspective, the real principle at stake was
that of Congolese sovereignty, and hence the real issue was the
unilateral intervention of Belgian forces in Congolese territory. This
was as much the view of Kasavubu and other "moderates" as it was of
the fiery Lumumba. In the view of Kasavubu and Lumumba, it was
they who had aroused the UN's interest in the Congo, specifically by
sending two telegrams to Hammarskjold on 12 and 13 July,
respectively. 17 According to the request made in the first telegram,
"The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the
national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression
which is a threat to international peace." Though this sentence seems to
make the nature of the request clear, Kasavubu and Lumumba further
13 "First Report of the Secretary -General on the Implementation of the
July 14, 1960, Security Council Resolution," July 18, 1960, U.N.
Document S/4389, Security Council Official Records [SCOR], Supp. for
July-September, 1960, p.22.
14 Of the dozens of scholarly studies of the Congo crisis and the ONUC
mission, that of Paul-Henry Gendebien L'intervention des Nations Unies au
Congo, 1960-1964, (Paris: lnstitut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales
Universite Lovanium de Kinshasa, 1967), pp.38 -41) best recognizes the
importance of the ambiguity of the original resolutions authorizing the
U.N . mission . Cf. on this point, Hoskyns, p.117.
15SCOR , 873rd meeting, 13/14 July 1960, ~211. Cf. Hoskyns, p.117 .
16Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, (New York: Knopf, 1972), p.403.
17These were circulated at the U.N. as Document S/4382.
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stressed the same point in their subsequent telegram, indicating that
"the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation
in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of
aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops." 18 The first
telegram had also expressed the Congolese suspicion that Belgium was
behind the secession of Katanga. As for the attacks on Europeans, the
Congolese stressed the fact that the great majority of these attacks
occurred only after the Belgian intervention. Needless to say, the
Soviets backed the Congolese view of the need for countervailing
intervention to restore Congolese sovereign rights. 19
Recounting hair-raising accounts of the rape of European women
and other misdeeds of the mutinous Congolese soldiers, a Belgian
witness to the first Security Council debate on the Congo crisis stressed
the humanitarian nature of Belgian intervention. Henry Cabot Lodge,
speaking for the U.S., was more conciliatory, praising the "popularlyelected, duly constituted" Government of the Congo for its efforts "to
restore peace, security and tranquility in the country. "20 Yet Lodge
echoed other Western countries in the contention that the Security
Council session had been convened by the Secretary-General, and not by
the Congolese themselves. 21 This claim reinforced the Western view
that the real purposes of the UN mission were to (1) restore order to the
country and (2) prevent any further unilateral intervention in the Congo
by other powers. Without being abrasive, Lodge stated the U.S. view
that no aggression had taken place, and he emphasized the unacceptable
loss of life in the Congo, which he said was in a state of "nearanarchy. "22 Lodge certainly sympathized with the view later expressed
by the French delegate that the Belgian intervention was in accord with
the "principle of international law" that accepted "intervention on
humanitarian grounds." 23 Thus, the role of the UN forces was to
replace the Belgian troops and restore order.
Meanwhile, Hammarskjold's position, which was a complex, even
18Emphasis added.
19See SCOR , 873rd meeting, 13/14 July 1960, 199-108.
20 Ibid ., 192 -98 .
21The first U.N. debate on the Congo opened with a protracted
discussion of whether the Congo's appeals to Hammarskjold should be
included on the provisional agenda. The Congolese, it seems, had made an
error of protocol in addressing their telegrams to Hammarskjold rather than
to the President of the Security Council. Consequently, it was technically
Hammarskjold himself , rather than the Congolese, who called for the first
Security Council meeting.
22 Ibid., p. 95. One should perhaps note that the initial Resolution on
the Congo situation does not condemn Belgium for aggression, but it does
call on Belgium to withdraw. However, it does not call for an "immediate "
withdrawal as the Soviets and Congolese requested .
23 /bid., p. 144.
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tortured vision of the UN's mandate in the Congo, represented a middle
ground between these two views. In his statement in the Security
Council's first debate, HammarskjlHd declared that the UN should base
its response to the Congo crisis on the successful UNEF mission to the
Middle East after the Suez war in 1956, which was described in a report
that he himself had written. 24 The Secretary-General argued that the
mission would have to respect certain principles, including these
requirements for the UN force: (1) that the mission would be composed
of personnel from neutral countries only; (2) that the mission would
only be allowed to use force in self-defense; and (3) that the mission
would not take actions that made it party to any internal disputes.
Hammarskj6ld's hope was that the ONUC could restore order to the
Congo, which would allow Belgian forces to withdraw, and for Katanga
to be re-incorporated. This, in Lum, would prevent further unilateral
interventions.
Regarding the political disposition of UN forces in the Congo,
Hammarskjold acknowledged in his first report on the ONUC mission,
dated 14 July, that the ONUC mission was "dispatched to the Congo at
the request of the Government and will be present in the Congo with its
consent ... " He further stated that its authority "cannot be exercised
within the Congo either in competition with representatives of the host
Government or in co-operation with them in any joint operation. "25
Legally, Hammarskjold was treading a narrow path as well. As
Kasavubu and Lumumba's original complaints were made to
HammarskjlHd rather than directly to the Council, they were not
included as an agenda item at the initial debate. Moreover, the Council
"did not endorse the accusation of aggression against Belgium and did
not call for the setting up of an emergency force Loprotect the Congo
against the Belgian forces."26 Accordingly, Hammarskjold regarded the
UN action as being taken under Article 40 of the Charter, which simply
allowed the Security Council to "call upon the parties concerned [in a
dispute] to comply with such provisional measures as it deems
necessary or desirable. "27 The implication of this interpretation is that
the UN was not taking a legally enforceable decision against a declared
Belgian aggression. At the same time, Hammarskj6ld made it clear that
24 /bid ., p. 28. (Hammarskjold 's full comments are contained in p. 1829.) The report is called "Summary Study on the Experience derived from
the Establishment and Operation of the [U.N. Emergency] Force: Report of
the Secretary-General," General Assembly Official Record Document
N3943 . For analysis of Hammarskjold's position see especially Arthur Lee
Bums and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by UN . Forces: From Suez to the
Con;o, (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp.24-28.
2 SCOR S/4389 (see note 13, supra), p. 7 and 12, respectively.
26 Hoskyns, p.120; Cf., Bums and Heathcote, p.26.
27
0n this point compare the two sources cited immediately above.
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Article 2(7) of the Charter, which prohibited the UN from intervening
"in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state ... " stilJ applied to the Congo.
Critical reflection on the position of Hammarskjold reveals a great
many contradictions in the internal logic of his view of the ONUC's
mandate, not to mention its contradictions with the Soviet and Western
views. First, Hammarskjold explicitly based the mandate on the
precedents of the UN missions to Egypt and Lebanon, which "from a
legal point of view [were] concerned only with questions of foreign
intervention and international boundaries." 28 Yet there were already two
internal dimensions to the Congo crisis, namely the military mutinies
and the Katanga secession. It should be quite obvious to even the
weakest reasoning that the UN force could not at once provide the
Congolese Government "with such military assistance as may be
necessary until . . .the national security forces [can] ... meet fully
their tasks" and stay neutral in internal Congolese disputes .
Hammarskjold's view of the UN mission called for neutrality, while
UNSC Resolution S/4387 instructed him to organize a UN force to
help the Congolese Government perform the tasks which, "in the
opinion of the Government," were necessary. Clearly, the first tasks of
any government is to protect itself from foreign invasion and to
maintain the territorial integrity of the state, so it is perfectly
reasonable that the Congolese considered the withdrawal of Belgium and
the restoration of its sovereignty over Katanga as its first priorities.
In the face of Hammarskjold's failure to reconcile these
contradictions, the various parties to the dispute continued to press for
their own views of the ONUC's mandate throughout its existence. One
has to acknowledge, however, that operative clause 2 of S/4387 is
much closer to the Congolese -Soviet interpretations than to the
Western one.
Outline of Subsequent
the ONUC

Outcomes in the Congo in View of

Here we shall summarize the course of the ONUC mission with
reference to its mandates. A number of important developments in the
Congo with relevance to the performance of the ONUC are also
sketched, without judgment to their cause or meaning . A full
evaluation of the ONUC mission is made in the following section.
Let us begin with the question of the withdrawal of the Belgian
forces . Belgian forces were withdrawn from all parts of the Congo
except Katanga with reasonable speed, as UN forces arrived to replace
them and protect civilians. By 23 July, the Belgian forces had been
28 Hoskyn s,

p .121.
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withdrawn to their Treaty bases or to Belgium, except in Katanga.29 In
Katanga, though, some 500 Belgian combat soldiers remained until the
first week in September. Significantly, the Belgian troops there took
firm steps to suppress forces of the Armee Nationale Congolaise
(ANC) 30 which had remained loyal to the central government during
this period, enabling Tshombe to consolidate military control. As
Hoskyns noted, "These [loyal ANC] troops were not disorderly; they
had merely refused to surrender." 31 In addition, some 250 Belgian
officers stayed on in Katanga after September, and some thirty to forty
remained after the beginning of 1961.32 Finally, some 300 foreign
mercenaries were recruited by the Katangan government for service in
1960-61, many of whom were Belgian. 33 Most observers agree that
Tshombe's regime would never have maintained its independence for so
long with this outside support 34
In regard to the restoration of order to the Congo, one should
distinguish between the immediate outcome of the UN's entry and the
longer term. In the short term, relative order returned to the Congo,
especially defined as the provision of safety to European and African
civilians. This is not to say, of course, that lives were not lost in the
ensuring political tumult, but only that civil order was generally
reestablished.
In the larger context the Congo continued to be plagued by grave
political unrest during the whole 1960-64 period. First, there was a
breakdown -- or bifurcation -- of the central Congolese government
itself. On 5 September, following growing disputes over the UN
operation and other issues, Kasavubu announced the dismissal of
Lumumba. Lumumba rejected this measure, however, and declared
Kasavubu dismissed. Though Lumumba certainly lacked authority to
take this step, Congo's Loi Fondamenta/e was unclear on Kasavubu's
rights, and a vote of Assembly showed that most of the Congolese
political class still supported Lumumba. 35 Subsequently, most of the
government came to support one side or the other. It was at this early
stage that Joseph Mobutu first entered the Congolese political scene, by
"neutralizing" both Kasavubu and Lumumba, and putting in place an
29Epstein,

pp.14-15 and 19.
°The new name for the Congolese national army, adopted shortly after
independence .
31 op . cit., p .142.
32 Hoskyns, p.384 . According to Connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga
and Back : A UN Case History, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1962),
p.197, these Belgian officers remained in Katanga with the approval of the
Belfian government.
3O'Brien, pp.197 and 199.
34 We shall return to the Katanga question momentarily.
35 See Hoskyns, pp.206 and 208-210.
3
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interim "collegial" regime. 36
After Lumumba's murder in Katanga in January 1961,37 his
supporters, including especially Antoine Gizenga and Christophe
Gbenye, carried on a struggle in the Orientale province in Lumumba's
name until 1964. Another, Maoist, revolutionary, Pierre Mulele,
conducted a parallel insurgency in the Kwilu district of the Bandundu
province at the same time. 38 Political order was not really reestablished in the Congo until after Mobutu's November 1965 coup.
As noted above, the ONUC was charged with maintaining
neutrality and cooperating with the Congolese government while
accomplishing its tasks. In regard to the UN's cooperation, Congolese
authorities rarely felt that the ONUC was cooperating with it. For
instance, soon after the ONUC's arrival, a detachment of Ghanaians,
commanded by a British general, began to disarm Congolese troops in
Leopoldville.
In Lumumba's eyes, this was not only lack of
cooperation , but an outright violation of Congolese rights, and he
protested to the President of the Security Council in an official letter.39
By far the most irritating failure of the UN mission from Lumumba's
perspective, though, was its dealings with the secessionist Tshombe
regime. 40 In keeping with his reading of the original S/4387
Resolution, Lumumba had expected the UN to help his government
expel the Belgians and re-establish control in Katanga. Instead,
Hammarskjold began patient negotiations with Tshombe. When
Hammarskjold passed through Leopoldville on his way to Katanga
without stopping to consult Lumumba in mid-August, the Congolese
Prime Minister lost all faith in the UN mission, and communications
between Hammarskjold and Lumumba completely broke down.41
Yet, Congolese dissatisfaction with the UN mission was hardly
36 See

Ibid., pp.210 -17.

37 See below for more details .
38 0n these revolts see R. C. Fox,

W de Cramer and J. M. Ribeaucourt ,
"The Second Independence: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the
Congo," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (1965), Crawford
Young, "Significance of the 1964 Rebellion ," in Helen Kitchen (ed.),
Footnotes to the Congo Story, (New York : Walker and Co., 1967), and
Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964,
(Ithaca : Cornell Univ. Press, 1974), pp .190-216 .
39 UNSC Document S/4414, "Letter Dated 31 July from the Prime
Minister of the Republic of the Congo to the President of the Security
Council."
40 See Hoskyns, pp.162 -78 and Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables: The
Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy. (New York: Macmillan,
1982), pp.47 -50.
41 See Urquhart, pp.428-29 . In tum, Hammarskjold was "clearly angry"
and "felt personally insulted" by Lumumba's tone in the meeting that took
place after Hammarskjold's return . See Hoskyns, p.174 .
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Lumumba's alone; Kasavubu, Mobutu and others were equally disapproving of UN activities in the Congo, concerning Katanga as well as
many other issues. For instance, HammarskjcHd's third Special
Representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, had to be replaced
because of the UN's policies during his tenure in 1960-61.42
As for maintaining neutrality, this charge became much more
difficult to perform after the split between Kasavubu and Lumumba in
September 1960. It was difficult enough to maintain neutrality
between a central government and wayward province, but quite
impossible to maintain it between competitors for control at the center.
In the event, Andrew Cordier had just arrived at the end of August to
replace Hammarskjold's original lieutenant in the Congo, Ralph
Bunche, when this crisis broke. In the aftermath of Kasavubu's
announcement dismissing Lumumba, Cordier took two decisions that
he putatively thought to be "neutral" ones, in the best interest of the
situation as a whole: he closed Congo's major airports and he closed
the Leopoldville radio station. In fact, both of these decisions worked
against Lumumba. Since Kasavubu had an ethnic base of supporters in
Leopoldville, he did not require outside support, but Lumumba could
have gained from flying in supporters from outside. Secondly,
Lumumba's prowess as an orator was legendary, and there is a real
chance that he could have prevailed on the masses for support, given
access to the radio .43 Moreover, Kasavubu's forces could make use of
the radio station across the Congo River in Brazzaville, where the
conservative regime of Fulbert Youlou was in power.44 Cordier's brief
tenure of a few days as the UN's chief representative in the Congo
proved crucial because of the close collaboration between Cordier and
conservative Congolese politicians. 45 Later, when Lumumba was put
42 See particularly p.210ff and Chapter 13 of Dayal's memoir, Mission
for Hammarskjold : The Congo Crisis, (Princeton : Princeton Univ. Press,
1976). Also see Kasavubu's letters to Hammarskjold dated 22 February
1961 (U.N. Document S/4743) and 6 March 1961 (U.N. Document S/4752),
which expresses the former's dismay over certain provisions of the Security
Council's Resolution of 21 February 1961 (S/4691) and speculation that the
U.N. would take over the A.N.C.
43 Later, while under arrest at the Thysville military base, Lumumba
persuaded his jailers to release him.
44 On both these points, see Hoskyns, p.204.
45 See Carole Collins, "Fatally Flawed Mediation:
Cordier and the
Congo Crisis of 1960," Africa Today, 39, 3 (1992), pp .5-22 ; the
appearance of this article is illustrative of the continuing fascination and
controversy surrounding the ONUC mission. As Thomas Kanza, Lumumba's
capable U .N. ambassador noted , "Cordier's presence in Leopoldville
presaged a whole new tum of events in the Congo, and certainly not one
that would be to the advantage of Lumumba . . ." [From The Rise and Fall of
Patrice Lumumba : Conflict in the Congo, 3rd. ed . Cambridge, Mass .:
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under house arrest by Kasavubu, UN troops had to surround his house
to prevent him from being arrested or killed. These events are
illustrative of the impossibility of UN neutrality in Congo's internal
politics.
Another implied charge of the ONUC mission was to prevent
further outside intervention, especially by the superpowers, and to thus
to avert another Cold War crisis. This responsibility was best reflected
in the second operative clause of the Security Council's second
resolution on the Congo (S/4405), passed on 22 July 1960. This
clause requested all states
to refrain from any action which might tend to
impede the restoration of law and order [in the Congo]
... and also to refrain from any action which might
undermine the territorial integrity and the political
independence .. . of the Congo.
The debate on this Resolution made it clear that the two Cold War
antagonists were calling for mutual restraint from unilateral
intervention, as well as indirectly condemning the continuing Belgian
presence in Katanga. The same principle was tacitly part of the
superpower support of the previous Resolution on the Congo.
In the event, both superpowers became involved in the Congo
situation outside the ONUC context, and the crisis became the source of
a major confrontation between them. To begin with the Soviets, their
growing disillusionment with the ONUC mission parallelled that of
their would-be client , Lumumba. The Soviets, in keeping with their
view of the ONUC mandate, were enraged by what they perceived as the
slow pace of Belgian withdrawal, the lack of cooperation of UN
authorities with Lumumba, and the ONUC's tardiness in dealing with
Tshombe. The Soviets were aware of how dependent the UN mission
was on American support, despite the fact that the troops came from
neutral countries, and one month after the ONUC inception, they were
complaining that "the prestige of the UN is being trampled in the
mud. "46 At the Fourth Security Council session dealing with the
Congo situation and the ONUC, the Soviets expressed total
consternation with Hammarskjold's conduct in the Congo, particularly
his negotiations with the rebellious Katangans, echoing the speeches of

Schenkman, 1979), p.276.] Kanza argues (p.283) that Cordier's influence
was important in encouraging Kasavubu to act against Lumumba on 5
September.
46 CurrenJ Digest of the Soviet Press, [CDSPJ. vol. XII, no.31, "Masks
Are Off: Warfare of North Atlantic 'Democrats ' for Black Slavery," [3
August 1960 Pravda article].
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Gizenga, representing the Congo, and a delegate representing Guinea.47
From this point on, the Soviets withdrew all support from the ONUC
and increasingly saw the UN mission as an extension of American
policy in the Congo. In fact, the Soviets soon began a long, tough
campaign against the UN, including their now-famous "troika
proposal," under which the Secretary-General was to be replaced by a
committee of three persons, representing Western, East bloc and nonaligned interests, respectively.48
This disillusionment led the Soviets to respond to a request made
by Lumumba for unilateral Soviet aid. In late August Khrushchev
ordered approximately ten Soviet IL-14 transport planes with their
crews, technicians, translators, and equipment to the Congo. 49 On 24
August Lumumba demanded control of the airport at Stanleyville, his
base of support, from UN forces. Having stopped in a number of
locations along the way (including Cairo, where the planes may have
taken on their arms and ammunition after being inspected in Greece),
the planes landed in Stanleyville on the night of 30 August.
Lumumba's immediate end in requesting the Soviet aircraft, pilots and
arms was to use them to put down the secessionist rebellion in
Katanga, and another that later erupted in Kasai province . Lumumba
had hoped that such successes would in tum establish his legitimacy
throughout the Congo, hasten the Belgian withdrawal and thereby render
the UN presence irrelevant. Unfortunately for him, though, the march
he ordered on Katanga disintegrated into ethnic warfare, in which some
200 BaLuba were murdered .50 Moreover, the desperate move turned
Kasavubu against Lumumba and goaded the U.S. into more vigorous
action to eliminate the fiery Congolese Prime Minister from the scene.
Later, in December 1960 when Lumumba was under arrest, Gizenga set
up a parallel government for Congo in Stanleyville in Lumumba's
name, to which the Soviets also sent limited aid.51
47 Hoskyns , pp.175 -78; all of the other Security Council members
declared (except Poland) themselves supportive of Hammarskjold, but,
according to Hoskyns, (p.178) Ceylon and Tunisia, the two neutral powers
present "had serious doubts about his policies ," despite their public
support.
48 See especially Kalb, pp.109 -27 on these events .
49 Kalb, p.58. (The U.S. learned of this Soviet move soon afterwards
when the Soviets asked Greece for permission for their cargo planes to land
and refuel in Greece, or to overfly Greek territory, while carrying food to the
Congo .) The actual number of Soviet planes sent to the Congo is a matter
of some question . The confusion arises from the fact that two sets of Soviet
aircraft are in question : those already in the Congo in support of the U.N .
mission, and those sent surreptiously at the end of August. For some of the
various numbers given by different sources , see Kalb, fn.6, p.406 .
50 Hoskyn s, p. 194; Kalb, pp.68 -70 .
51 See Kalb, pp.169, 217 - 18 and 223 .
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The U.S. began interfering in Congolese politics in a low-level
fashion virtually from the moment that Lumumba took power. 52 The
American ambassador in the Congo, Clare Timberlake, was a confirmed
anti-communist who viewed Lumumba as a potential dupe of the
Soviet Union in Africa.
Timberlake encouraged Lumumba's
opponents, including Kasavubu, in their campaigns against him,
especially after the Hammarskjold-Lumumba split. It was also
confirmed in 1975, after many years of speculation, that the American
Central Intelligence Agency had specific plans to assassinate
Lumumba. 53 The plans had initially called for activities to undermine
Lumumba politically (such as bribing Congolese politicians to
withdraw support from Lumumba), but when these failed, a firm
assassination plot was devised. According to the Church Committee
report, "The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is
strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to
assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower
[himself]." 54 Though the exact circumstances of Lumumba's murder
after being flown to Elizabethville (Katanga) in January 1961 remain
controversial, it appears that he was killed by Katangan gendarmes not
under CJ.A. direction. 55
In a more general way, the Soviets and many Congolese believed
that the ONUC operated in a fashion that served U.S. interests, rather
than according to its mandate. This was more true at some times (as
during Cordier's brief tenure in the Congo) than it was at others (as
when Dayal served as the UN's Special Representative). After John
Kennedy became President in the U.S., American interference with UN
52 The works most critical of U.S. policy in the Congo, and most
specific about U.S. misdeeds in the country in the early periods are those of
Weissman, Kalb and Collins, all cited above.
53 See U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Alleged
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Sess.,
1975 .
54 /bid., p.51.
55The American role in Lumumba's murder also remains controversial.
Lumumba was sent to Elizabethville by Kasavubu's government after he had
once escaped from detention at the Thysville base, and headed off towards
his base in Stanleyville, rallying Congolese to his cause along the way.
The U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville was urging Lumumba's re-arrest and
confinement in a safer location at that time. On the other hand, the CIA
station chief in Elizabethville was genuinely surprised when Lumumba was
brought to Katanga as a prisoner. It is unclear whether the Leopoldville
authorities who affected Lumumba's second arrest intended for him to be
killed or not. It was apparently Tshombe's forces who actually murdered
Lumumba . See Kalb, pp .128-96, Hoskyns, pp.301 -337, Lefever, p.51, and
O'Brien, pp.96-97.
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activities diminished, but then increased again after Lyndon Johnson
assumed office in December 1963.56
In Congolese politics itself, the U.S. became increasingly
influential during the years of the UN presence.
Kennedy's
administration labored to restore parliamentary government in the
Congo, helping to win support for the regimes of Joseph Ileo, and then
Cyrille Adoula, who succeeded Lumumba as Prime Minister in the
First Republic. As one observer put it, "The American government not
only supported Adoula; it was, in many ways, part of his
government. "57 During these years the U.S. gave substantial economic
and military aid to the succeeding Congolese governments, with which
they fought the Lumumbist rebels and bought political support for
themselves. 58 Later, when the forces of Gbenye seized Stanleyville and
took some 300 Western hostages, American planes flew in Belgian
troops to save them and crush the last serious attempt to establish a
Lumumbist regime in the Congo.59
In sum, then, the ONUC did not serve to prevent a superpower
confrontation over the Congo crisis . Rather, it became intertwined in a
superpower struggle for influence in the Congo lasting over several
years. We shall further evaluate the meaning of these events below.
Another of the ONUC's mandates, to restore Congolese
sovereignty in Katanga, was, as noted above, in dispute. While
Lumumba was in power, the Western powers, including the U.S., took
the view that this task should only be carried out by negotiation (in
keeping with Harnmarskjiild's determinations not to use force, except in
self-defense, or to become party to "internal disputes"). In any case, this
task was not a priority for the UN. In the course of 1961, however, as
a relatively stable and pro-Western government was established in
Leopoldville, neutralist and moderate Western pressures for the UN to
take action in Katanga grew. In February 1961, following Lumumba's
death, and in the face of the continuing presence of the Belgian military
personnel in Katanga, the Security Council passed another resolution
on Congo explicitly and forcefully requiring a complete withdrawal of
"all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and
political advisers" from Katanga. 60 Hammarskjold then appointed
Connor Cruise O'Brien , who was committed to Congolese unity, to
become the UN's representative in Elizabethville and carry out this task.
While O'Brien thought that it would be possible for the UN to
56 0n the changes occasioned by Kennedy's accession to office, see
Weissman, pp.116-19 and 138-39.
57 Wei ss man, p.205 .
58/bid ., pp .201-20, 215-16 and 229 .
59Ibid ., pp.244 -47 .
60-faken from Operative Paragraph 2 of Resolution S/4741, passed on 21
February 1961.
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expel the Belgian officers and mercenaries from Katanga without resort
to force, he felt that he had authority under the various UN resolutions
to do so if necessary. 61 O'Brien undertook two military operations to
expel the mercenaries and impose the authority of the UN in preparation
for a return of central government authority. The first of these
operations (code-named "Rumpunch") was bloodless, but succeeded only
in expelling some of the foreign mercenaries. The second operation
("Morthor"), in September 1961, led to heavy fighting between UN
forces and the Katangan "gendarmerie. "62 It was in the aftermath of this
episode that Hammarskjold decided to fly to Elizabethville to negotiate
again with Tshombe, and on the night of 17 September, his plane
mysteriously crashed some ten miles from the airport, killing all of
those aboard. Subsequently, O'Brien was fiercely attacked in the
Western media for provoking the use of force in Katanga, and he
ultimately resigned in protest so that he could speak out against the
UN's lack of resolve.
"Morthor" and Hammarskjold's death led the Security Council to
pass still another Resolution (S/5002) on 24 November, which, for the
first time, condemned the rebellious Katangan government by name. It
also made explicit the authority that had so long been in dispute .
Article 4 stated that
[The Security Council] [a]uthorizes the SecretaryGeneral to take vigorous action, including the
requisite use of force, if necessary, for the immediate
apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or
deportation of all foreign military and para-military
personnel and political advisers [in Katanga] ... 63
It took Hammarskjold's replacement, U. Thant , some time to get settled
into his new position, and in the interim, the UN sponsored an
interminable round of negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe .
When these made no headway, Thant announced a plan in August 1962
to re-incorporate Katanga, which threatened Tshombe's government
with a total boycott of Katangan minerals if it did not accept the central
government's authority. 64 When these sanctions were imposed as
promised, the situation in Katanga began to deteriorate, and fighting in
December broke out between the UN forces stationed there and
Tshombe's gendarmerie. The UN forces there took advantage of these
61 O'Brien,

pp.102 and 212.
on these events, see Gerard -Libois , Chap.6 , "The Trials of
Strength in the Second Half of 1961."
63 Emphasis added.
64 See Gerard -Libois, Chap . 8, "The Thant Plan for National
Reconciliation ."
62 Also
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skirmishes to occupy the key centers in Katanga, and drive out the
remnants of the mercenary corps. 65 In this way, the long secession
finally ended at the end of 1962.

Further Evaluation of the ONUC Mission
The description of any set of events, and certainly a set of events as
complex as those encompassing the ONUC's mission between 196064, necessarily entails subtle or not-so-subtle evaluations of those
events. The description offered above is intended to be as neutral as
possible, though those familiar with the events in the Congo between
1960-64 and afterwards, harboring a range of political and ideological
predispositions, will inevitably find some aspects unsatisfying . Yet the
description of events, i.e., getting the facts right and culling the highlyrelevant from the less-relevant, is only the beginning of the difficulty of
making an evaluation of the ONUC mission (or of any foreign policy
initiative). Additionally, one must consider at least three other
questions: (1) Against what set of goals should the ONUC mission be
judged? (2) What would have happened in the Congo had the ONUC
mission not been organized? and (3) What alternatives to the mission
were there for the UN or for various states at the time of the Congo
crisis?
Bearing these considerations in mind allows one to appreciate the
great range of judgements that have been made of the ONUC mission.
At one end of the spectrum was the conservative opinion that the UN
mission went far beyond its mandate in suppressing the establishment
of Katanga as a separate state. 66 This certainly was the view of the
Belgian industrialists who controlled the mineral resources of Katanga .
Towards the same end of the spectrum, many American policy-makers
in Washington, and Timberlake in Leopoldville, believed that the
Soviet Union had well-defined, aggressive designs to establish a close
relationship with Lumumba, and possibly to transform his vague antiimperialism into a rigorously-Marxist mode of thought. 67 They also
thought Lumumba was quite susceptible to such a result, regarding him
as unstable, radical by nature and firmly anti-Western. This group
approved of the ONUC in general, but frequently regretted specific
decisions that it took, especially after September when Dayal attempted
65 See

Gerard -Libois, Chap.9, "The Final Trial of Force."
view was expressed, for instance, by Arthur Krock in the New
York Times, 4 December 1964, cited in LeFever, p.171.
67Besides Kalb, Chaps . 1 and 2, see on this matter Michael Schatzberg's
Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990, (Lanham, Md.:
Univ. Press of America, 1991). Though derivative of many other earlier
works on U.S.-Zairian relations, this work provides a useful "short-take" on
official Washington attitudes towards the Congo crisis and Lumumba .
66This
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to put the ONUC on a more genuinely neutral tack between Lumumba
and his rivals. Had Lumumba remained in power, this group would
certainly have judged the ONUC mission a failure.
At the other end of the spectrum was the Soviet view that the
ONUC was an instrument of American foreign policy, i.e., of imperialism from the moment that it entered the Congo. The extraordinary
scorn heaped on Hammarskjbld and the UN in the Soviet press during
this time is still striking. 68 Some American observers have argued
similarly, if less rhetorically, that American policy was the slave of
capital interests, and that the ONUC mission became little more than
an instrument of American policy. 69 The attitude of many strong
African nationalists has also been quite similar. 70 The focus of these
writers' disgust was the ONUC's apparent paternalism towards Africans,
its failure to take Lumumba seriously as the Congolese leader, despite
his widespread popularity, and its domination by Western diplomats in
the highest posts. Not as shrill, and more effectively critical is the
commentary of Thomas Kanza, who served as Lumumba's ambassador
to the UN in 1960.71 Kanza demonstrated great equanimity in his
discussion of the roots of the Congo crisis, arguing, for instance that
"the tragedy unfolding in the Congo could be traced to the total absence
of any mental decolonization among the Belgians and the total lack of
any leadership among the Congolese capable of securing power
effectively. "72 Unlike those who lionized Hammarskjbld, Kanza
recognized the flaws of the Secretary-General, as well as his virtues. 73
In keeping with these personal evaluations, and his negative view of
Cordier's role, Kanza certainly felt that the ONUC mission had failed to
respect its mandate, which was to aid the Congolese government (then
led by Lumumba).
68 See, e.g ., the articles reprinted in CDSP, XII, nos. 28-32, covering the
period from mid-July through August 1960, including those cited above.
69 Besides Weissman, the first to argue the theory that U.S. policy was
secretly controlled by corporate interests , this view was recently echoed by
David N. Gibbs in his book, The Political Economy of Third World
Intervention : Mines, Money, and U.S . Policy in the Congo Crisis,
(Chicago : Univ . of Chicago Press, 1991).
70 E.g ., Washington Okumu, Lumumba's Congo : Roots of Conflict,
(New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1963) and D. Katete Orwa, The Congo
Betrayal : The UN-US and Lumumba, (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau,
1985) .
71 See note 43, supra . Kanza proved himself extremely diplomatic,
articulate and capable at his U .N. appearances in 1960, far more so, in fact,
than the Belgian representative.
120p . cit., p .221. Emphasis added.
73 For some of Kanza's important observations on Lumumba and
Hammarskjold, see op. cit., pp .238-263 . Kanza had a similarly balanced
view of Lumumba's greatness and short-comings .
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The strongest supporters of the ONUC mission have been certain
"moderates" in the establishment foreign policy circles of several
Western states, including many with some role in the mission itself.
For instance, King Gordon, who served as the ONUC's Chief
Information Officer until August 1962 offered this interim appraisal in
late 1962:
The amazing thing about ONUC has been that in the
face of incredible difficulties and frustrations it has
discharged its central purposes so well. ONUC was
called into being because the Congo was thought to
constitute a threat to international peace and security.
In spite of the constant maneuverings of the great
powers and reflections of the cold war in internal and
external politics, ONUC's fiJling the vacuum headed
off major conflict. 74
Ernest Lefever, who worked as a researcher for the Brookings Institute
and as a government consultant, later expressed a similar view after the
ONUC mission was over:
[The ONUC] sometimes fumbled. It made many
small mistakes. It was assailed on all sides. It
precipitated a financial crisis for the United Nations.
But in the final analysis, the UN Force must be
judged by its contribution to international stability,
regardless of what other interest it might have served.
So judged, the mission succeeded. It contributed to
peace and security in Central Africa and in the wider
world. 75
Lefever's conclusion rests explicitly on his contentions that (1) all the
14 The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace, (New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp.182 -83. One
should note that not all of the mission's participants ended their service to
the U .N. with such feelings, however.
O'Brien's book, cited above,
contains a sharp and well-argued critique of the ONUC.
15 Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action, (Washington: Brookings, 1965), p.181. Cf. the (similar) conclusions of Ernest
Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo:
1960-1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control, vol.
2 (Full Text), (Washington:
Brookings, 1966), pp.394-434.
Lefever
forthrightly acknowledges in his 1965 book, however, that the course of
events in the Congo served the interests of the U.S. in its cold war contest
with the Soviet Union.
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other options for dealing with the crisis--which he limits to unilateral
interventions by specific states: Belgium, an African group of states,
the Soviet Union or the U.S.--were less desirable; (2) the operation was
true to its mandate and (3) the operation was reasonably successful.
Much of the liberal, Western establishment doubtless continues to view
the ONUC mission in such a lighL
Perhaps, though, we can now "banish both the eulogistic
glorifications as well as the summary critiques" of the ONUC's record,
as one wise observer suggested in 1967.76 In regard, to the ONUC's
mandate to speed the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, for instance, its
record is decidedly mixed. Though the Belgians did withdraw from most
of the Congo rapidly, their continued presence in Katanga after 1960
contributed greatly to the prolongation of the province's secession. One
might be tempted to argue that, had the UN not intervened, then the
Belgians would have taken longer to withdraw, but this assumes the
same actions by the U.S., and no intervention by the Soviet Union.
Yet more vigorous Soviet unilateral intervention would have been
likely if the ONUC mission had not been organized. Or, if the United
States had joined the Soviet Union in demanding such a withdrawal,
Belgium might have ordered aJI her nationals home more quickly. In
reference to Katanga, those who favored the re-integration of the
province may either praise the ONUC for its ultimate decisiveness, or
regret the long interval between its entry into the Congo and its action
against the Tshombe regime.
Likewise, in regard to the restoration of order, one must judge the
UN's success mixed. In the short term, some relative order was restored
to the Congo. Yet the Western view has over-estimated the amount of
"disorder" that the Congo was suffering in July 1960, which was in fact
minimal, before the arrival of the Belgians. This suggests that order
might have been restored in Congo without the UN if Belgium had
shown more patience. And accordingly, perhaps the relative return to
order had more to do with the withdrawal of the Belgian troops than
with the UN's presence. In tum, the withdrawal of the Belgians might
have been accomplished in other ways besides the dispatch of the
ONUC, as suggested above. In the long term, order, repressive though
it has been, was only restored in the Congo by Joseph Mobutu and the
ANC.
As for Gordon's observation that the ONUC "headed off major
conflict," one can only find it rather ironic. If the West did not consider
the Congo crisis a major superpower crisis, the Soviets certainly did.
Their vituperation could scarcely have been stronger, and they came
close to ceasing all cooperation with the UN after the failure of their
"troika proposal." Each superpower intervened--the U.S. covertly and
76 Gendebien,

p.259.

Author's translation .

112 I The Journal of Political Science

Collective Interventions After the Cold War
the Soviets quietly--in the Congo on behalf of factions that it favored.
Nor does it appear that it was the ONUC which prevented the Soviets
from intervening more forcefully. Though world opinion may have
been a minor consideration for the Soviets, the deterrent power of the
American military was far more important. Given their level of
frustration with the ONUC's activities, the Soviets would not likely
have refrained from intervention in the face of world public opinion
alone. Thus, while one may speculate that the Soviet-American
confrontation over Congo might have been worse had the ONUC
mission not been organized, such speculation depends on the judgment
that the Soviets would have acted irrationally in the face of the thenexisting American military superiority.
As to Hammarskjold's pledge that the ONUC would be neutral in
the Congo's internal affairs, later incorporated in several resolutions on
the Congo crisis, at least two observations should be made. First, the
principle contradicts the main activating clause in the first resolution on
the Congo crisis, the resolution which organized the ONUC. That
resolution indicates that the purpose of the ONUC is to help the
Congolese government, not to mediate between warring factions. As a
result of the ONUC's subsequent practice in the Congo in the name of
this principle, Lumumba, many other Congolese, and the Soviets felt
that the UN came to the Congo under false pretenses. The second
observation about this pledge is that it proved, predictably, impossible
to keep. In the course of disarming soldiers or closing airports towards
the end of "restoring order," the ONUC inevitably effected the military
fortunes of the factions struggling for control in the Congo.
It is because of this mixed record of the ONUC, judged by its many
mandates, that the mission's supporters can find so much to praise in it,
and its detractors so much to blame. The nature of these judgments
points again to the overriding lesson that the contemporary world
should take from the ONUC experience: Since the mandate of the
ONUC was so unclear, and even contradictory, virtually no one was
satisfied with its actions in the Congo. A number of corollary lessons
accompany this general point. First, where the mandate of the UN is
unclear, a great deal of responsibility will rest with the SecretaryGeneral, which was certainly the case in the Congo. Second, there are
likely to be contests among the senior UN staff to have their own
reading of the mandate become the accepted one. Third, one cannot
expect the UN to act with particular swiftness or certitude in a local
setting. Fourth, where outside powers have parochial interests in, or
emotional ties to, events in the local setting, they are likely to
undertake unilateral interventions if their understanding of the mandate
is not followed. Fifth, if the permanent members of the Security
Council read an unclear mandate in different ways, and the UN follows
one interpretation over another, then the apparent, but unreal, consensus
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of the Council may break down. A number of other, related corollaries
could be drawn from the ONUC experience using this reasoning.

Lessons for Contemporary UN Missions
Since there is frequently disagreement among members of the
Council, even after the end of the Cold War, it may not, of course,
always be possible to get a strong mandate from the UN for specific
actions. In these situations, the real choice may be a UN mission with
a weak mandate, or none at all. For instance, in the Bosnian crisis, it
is apparent that Russia sympathizes more with the Serbians than the
other permanent members, which is one reason that the UN has a weak
mandate there. As in the Congo case, the UN is trying to remain
neutral among the warring sides, and is attempting to negotiate a
settlement among them. The heroic work of individual UN units in
Bosnia notwithstanding, however, there is a real danger that the UN has
or may become an "enabler." Like the person who mitigates the
terrible consequences of his spouse's alcoholism, and thereby
inadvertently perpetuates the problem, the UN in Bosnia has modestly
relieved the suffering of many civilians, while failing to address the
underlying problem. The enabler also delays or deters other outside
intervention in the situation.
The ONUC experience and this analysis suggests that it is time,
perhaps, for the UN to choose sides in Bosnia, and the "side" that it
should choose is obvious: the Bosnian government This government
not only has considerable international recognition, but also is open to
people of all religious backgrounds, Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox.
Logistically, the UN could certainly organize and dispatch to Bosnia a
military force capable of successfully aiding the Bosnian government to
establish its control over its territory. The problems with this
approach, though, are not primarily logistical, but political,
specifically, lack of courage in Western Europe and the U.S., and
sympathy for the Serbs in Russia. Perhaps these political problems
cannot be overcome, but if this is the case, then perhaps the UN should
simply withdraw. Then unilateral aid could flow in to the Bosnia
government from sympathetic Middle Eastern states and elsewhere. As
things stand, the UN justifies a ban on aid to all parties on the ground
of its presence in Bosnia.
As in Bosnia, the work of the UN in Somalia has been
extraordinary in its humanitarian accomplishments. Despite the virtual
absence of press coverage of its achievements in Somalia, the UN
mission there saved uncountable thousands of Somalis from starvation
during 1993. Yet the UN's more recent difficulties in Somalia reflect
the same weakness of mandate that troubled the ONUC and now
troubles the UN mission to Bosnia. The obvious solution is for the
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UN to organize a plebiscite for a new Somali constitution, and a series
of elections for the people to choose new leaders . With a new
government in place, the UN would have a tangible and reasonably
legitimate entity to support in Somalia. Unless the UN can
accomplish this task--and it is not suggested here that it will be
straight-forward or simple--then the future of the UN's role in Somalia
is unclear. To remain in perpetuity in interposition between a variety
of Somali opponents is an outcome that can satisfy few. Nor, as in
Cyprus, where the UN has established itself as an unending buffer
between the ethnically Turkish and Greek communities, does it appear
feasible that the UN can permanently keep the Somali factions apart.
In the case of Haiti, the UN seems to have recognized better that it
cannot at once intervene in the country's internal affairs, and remain
neutral between General Cedras and the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Now, with the international aspects of the Haiti crisis being few, the
UN appears to have limited its actions to an embargo . While this
decision no doubt grieves Mr. Aristide and his supporters, at least it
was a relatively decisive one.
One should be careful not to take the point made here too far.
Sometimes the UN humanitarian actions in the midst of political
crises, like facilitating the relief of the Somali famine, or the
dismantling of concentration camps in Bosnia, are extremely valuable.
If the UN is to be taken more seriously as a political instrument,
however, as the post-Cold War situation promises, then perhaps it is
time for its missions to become more precise and more definitive . This
would certainly raise the UN's credibility with would-be international
aggressors and tyrants. Collective security has never been the weakkneed alternative to unilateral intervention that its critics have portrayed
it to be. When employed decisively, as in the Persian Gulf, it can be
an effective instrument of the international community against
aggression . One of the great questions of the post-Cold War world is
whether the international community is now prepared to use collective
intervention decisively in cases that are primarily internal. If not, then
the world community must become more alert to the possibility that
the UN will become an enabler to violence where it intervenes halfheartedly. Though the determination to support decisive uses of UN
force in conflicts that are essentially domestic is difficult, it is on such
determinations that the future of the UN rests.
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